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Removing Emotional Harm from the
Core of Tort Law
Martha Chamallas*
My commentary is directed to one important feature of the
new Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Principles (Discus-
sion Draft) ("Discussion Draft")-the decision to remove liability
for emotional harm from the core of tort law. As a Torts professor, I
am very attracted to the Discussion Draft because to a large extent
it tracks the way I structure and teach torts to first year students.
It reflects what Professors Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson de-
scribe as the pedagogical canon in torts,2 by highlighting those top-
ics and subtopics that most professors emphasize in their scaled-
down Torts course and including the material that most agree every
beginning law student should know.
I am not so sure that the Discussion Draft responds as well
to the needs of practitioners and judges who have already passed
the course in Torts. For me, one test of a Restatement is whether it
will help lawyers and judges argue and decide the non-routine case,
where precedent is scarce and the stakes seem high. An irony of the
Restatement process is that a Restatement is needed to provide some
guidance for legal actors in cases where the boundaries and catego-
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. I wish to thank Vivian Curran for her in-
sights which I readily incorporated into this Commentary.
1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES (Discussion Draft Apr. 5, 1999)
[hereinafter Discussion Draft]. This commentary focuses solely on the Discussion Draft prepared
by Gary Schwartz and the critique of that draft contained in John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipurshy, The Third Restatement and the Place of Duty, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657 (2001). I have not
attempted to comment on the alternative draft prepared by Harvey Perlman. RESTATE.MEr
(THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES (Preliminary Draft No. 2, May 10. 2000) [hereinafter
Preliminary Draft No. 2].
2. See LEGAL CANONS 7 (J. M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson eds., 2000).
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ries are contested and everyone agrees that simply stating or re-
stating what purports to be the prevailing legal doctrine is not
enough. Thus, it is critically important that the framework of a Re-
statement to alert practitioners and judges to the areas of confusion
and contest and pay attention to those lively and dynamic areas of
the law where there are no clear trends. For this reason, I have al-
ways thought that the best parts of the Restatement were the Cave-
ats.3
For many years, I have had a fascination with tort claims for
emotional distress and relational injury, as opposed to claims for
physical harms to persons or damage to property. 4 I have studied
emotional distress cases principally because I regard these cases as
particularly important for women: whether it is a pregnant woman
seeking to recover for a miscarriage caused by fright in the 19th
century,5 or a mother in the late 1960s suing for the shock of wit-
nessing her child killed by a negligent driver,6 or a female patient
suing her doctor for wrongful birth in the 1980s. 7 In the hierarchy
of torts, emotional and relational harms are not as fully protected
as physical injury and property damage. This is a feature of modern
tort law that I have argued disproportionately harms women and
has meant that law does not recognize many of the important, re-
curring injuries in the lives of women.8
As much as I rail against it, however, I have come to expect
the marginalization of emotional harm in discussions of tort law.
3. The caveat and commentary following Section 46 made it clear that the law on inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress was in a stage of development and the Institute cautiously
expressed no opinion as to whether there might be circumstances beyond the scope of Section 46
that might subject an actor to liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 caveat & cmt. c
(1965).
4. See Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U.
PA. L. REV. 463 (1998); Martha Chamallas, with Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers and the Law
ofFrighk A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990).
5. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896); Victorian Rys. Commrs
v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C. 1888); see also Chamallas, with Kerber, supra note 4, at 826.
28 (discussing Mitchell).
6. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968); see also Chamallas, with Kerber, supra
note 4, at 855-58 (discussing Dillon).
7. See, e.g., Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1208 n.9 (Colo. 1988) (listing cases rec-
ognizing wrongful birth cause of action, decided mostly in the 1980s). I mention wrongful birth
claims in my discussion of negligent infliction of mental distress because the parents' emotional
distress in such cases is often a significant element of damages. The gravamen of wrongful birth
cases, however, is the denial of plaintiffs reproductive autonomy and choice and the claim is best
viewed as a species of informed consent. However, some courts have erroneously categorized
wrongful birth cases as "bystander" cases, even though the mother in such cases is typically a
patient of the defendant. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 292 (2000).
8. See Chamallas, supra note 4, at 489-503.
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But the Discussion Draft goes further than relegating emotional
harm to the margins. It excludes it altogether, at least in those por-
tions of the Restatement relating to basic principles. 9 The Introduc-
tory Note discloses that claims for emotional harm are left out of
the Restatement project that covers only "personal injury and prop-
erty damage."
The purpose of this Restatement project is to work through the "general" or "basic"
elements of the tort action for liability for accidental personal injury and property
damage. (The problem of accidental injury is what many see as the core problem
facing modern tort law.) Given the project's "general" interests, the project does
not cover such special topics as professional liability and landowner liability; and
given its focus on the core of tort law, it does not itself consider liability for emo-
tional distress or economic loss.' 0
The excision of mental distress cases from the Restatement is
accomplished by two interrelated cuts. First, cases of intentional
infliction of mental distress are excluded because "accidental in-
jury," rather than intentional torts, is declared to be "the core
problem facing modern law." Second, and most important for pur-
poses of this Commentary, is the exclusion of cases of negligent in-
fliction of mental distress." Even though such cases obviously con-
cern accidental injuries, they are likewise excluded, for the same
reason that they are not classified as within "the core of tort law."
This Commentary will first explore what it means to say that
emotional distress is not part of the core of tort law and as such is a
topic that does not warrant even specific sections in a text devoted
to the general principles of negligence law. I will then speculate on
what is lost by removing emotional harm from the basic text and
why I disagree with that choice. Finally, I will comment on the al-
ternative presented by John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky in
their article addressing duty in the Third Restatement. 12 In con-
trast to the Discussion Draft, Goldberg and Zipursky treat emo-
tional harm in two specific provisions under the heading of limited
9. The commentary to Section 3 indicates that "(t]he extent of liability in negligence for
economic loss and emotional distress is dealt with elsewhere in the Restatement of Torts." Dis-
cussion Draft, supra note 1, § 3 cmt. a. It is not clear, however, whether the cross-reference
refers to the provisions of the Second Restatement treating these topics or to a future Restate-
ment devoted to economic loss and emotional distress.
10. Id. at xxiL
11. The Discussion Draft also excludes cases of pure economic loss. See id. § 3. Although
some of the same objections to excluding emotional harm could also apply to the exclusion of
economic loss, this Commentary deals only with the Restatement's approach to emotional harm.
The exclusion of economic loss from the "core of tort law" also raises issues with respect to the
intersection of contract and tort law that are not as prominent in emotional distress cases.
12. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1.
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duty. 13 By retaining duty as an element of the plaintiffs prima facie
case and highlighting areas of limited duty, their analysis has the
virtue of calling some attention to emotional distress cases. How-
ever, in my view, neither their specific sections on emotional dis-
tress, nor their duty-focused, relational approach to negligence law
yet provides an adequate treatment of recovery for emotional harm.
Because the decision to exclude emotional harm from the
new Restatement of General Principles hinges on an assessment of
what is in the "core" of tort law, any challenge to that decision pre-
liminarily requires a definition of terms. Just what does it mean to
be at the core? The dictionary definition of the word is quite re-
vealing here. It defines "core" as "the hard or fibrous central part of
certain fruits, such as the apple and the pear, containing the seeds.
The innermost or most important part of something; heart; cen-
ter."14 The dictionary concept of "core" indicates that what is in the
core critically affects the rest of the entity, whether it is a fruit with
seeds or a conceptual category. It also embodies a judgment of
value, such that whatever is in (or gets placed in) the core is pre-
sumably more important or essential to the entire category than
what is outside the core.
As used in the Introductory Note, "the core of tort law" thus
signals that its contents are more important to tort law generally,
without disclosing the standard by which we should gauge impor-
tance. Absent further specification, the most that could be said is
that the "core of tort law" could conceivably have both a quantita-
tive and a qualitative dimension. Specifically, physical harm cases
may be said to be at the core of tort law because of their prevalence
or their centrality.
Although, like Goldberg and Zipursky, I am most interested
in the qualitative claim that physical harms are more central to tort
law, one point related to the quantitative claim deserves mention.
Clearly, cases of physical harm predominate simply as a numerical
matter. I have little doubt that there are more claims filed for neg-
ligent infliction of physical harm than for emotional distress, al-
though I wonder about the ratio of emotional harm to property
damage cases. The relative number of cases filed, however, does not
necessarily mean that, in the real world, physical injuries are more
prevalent than emotional harms or even that there are more legally
cognizable cases of physical injuries "out there" than emotional
13. See id. app. § D2(b)(1), (2).
14. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 324 (2d ed. 1982).
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harms. Instead, I suspect that there is a mutually reinforcing rela-
tionship between the responsiveness of the legal system to certain
types of injuries, on the one hand, and the number of such suits
filed, on the other.
Despite the perception that Americans are quick to resort to
the courts, there is a considerable gulf between possessing a formal
right of action and transforming that right into a lawsuit. People
cannot be expected to sue in large numbers unless there is social
support for their claims, their injuries are generally recognized as
real injuries, and there are no formidable structural barriers to as-
serting their claims. For example, in a recent manuscript, 15 Profes-
sor Jennifer Wriggins challenges the conventional wisdom that
compensation for accidental injury is the most critical problem fac-
ing tort law. She argues that given the current high rates of domes-
tic violence, sexual assault, and rape in our society, it is question-
able to view the compensation scheme for intentional injury as inci-
dental or as a thing of the past. Her argument has force if we
imagine that each incident of domestic violence or sexual assault
could form the basis of a tort claim. In such a world, we would
surely have to reassess whether accidental injury was the most
prevalent type of harm.
My larger point is that the number of lawsuits not only af-
fects what is considered to be the "core" of tort law, but what is re-
garded as "core" affects the number of suits filed. Given this inter-
relationship, we should hesitate to determine what is the core of
tort law solely by reference to a quantitative standard that equates
importance with prevalence. I also agree with Marshall Shapo's
practical observation that, given the overwhelming number of torts
cases, and the difficulties of calculating the numbers of each type of
case, the Reporters are probably wise not to rely principally on an
"abacus" or case counting approach to the Restatement process.16
The more interesting question is why is emotional harm not
treated as being central to tort law? What is it about the liability
rules for physical harm and property damage that justifies calling
them "general principles" and labeling the rules in emotional harm
cases "special applications"? What is implicit in these framing deci-
sions?
15. Jennifer Wriggins, U.S. v. Morrison and the Costs of Violence Against Women: Torts,
Insurance, and Ideas for Compensation 33-34 (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
16. See Marshall S. Shapo, On First Looking Into General Principles of Torts: Ruminations
on Restating for an Ex-Dean, 78 NEB. L. REV. 891, 894 (1999).
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As I see it, three types of arguments could be made to justify
the exclusion of emotional harm. Each of these arguments implic-
itly conveys a message about the relative importance of claims for
emotional distress, none of which I think is an accurate or desirable
restatement of contemporary law. Below, I list the arguments in
their barest form, before discussing them in more depth.
1. The Hierarchy Argument
The first argument is an implicit argument based on a hier-
archy of the types of harm. It claims that freedom from emotional
distress is invariably an interest of lesser importance that does not
deserve top billing with physical harm and property damage.
2. The Trend Argument
The second implicit argument or message relates to trends or
directions in the law. The argument is that, similar to most rela-
tional harms, such as claims for loss of consortium, claims for emo-
tional distress are being phased out, or at least there is no trend
towards enlarging these pockets of legal liability.
3. The Analytical Coherence Argument
The third argument centers on analytical coherence and
claims that separating emotional harm from the general principles
of negligence law is justifiable because the general principles do not
really explain the results in the emotional harm cases. Under this
view, an analysis of emotional harm cases will do little to enlarge
our understanding of general principles of tort law, such as reason-
ableness or proximate cause.
Let me dispatch the hierarchy argument briefly and concen-
trate on the trend and the analytical coherence arguments. At the
outset, I would question whether either current law or injured par-
ties invariably regard emotional harm-regardless of its severity
and regardless of the context of the case-as being of a lesser order
than physical harm or property damage. Rather than reflecting a
strict, categorical approach to liability, the cases suggest that it is
the degree of harm, rather than the nature of the harm, that is often
of paramount importance in determining the scope of liability.
Thus, in cases of intentional infliction of mental distress, most
courts allow recovery without proof of physical harm or physical
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manifestations, provided that plaintiffs can prove that their dis-
tress was severe. 17 Although the trend is less pronounced in cases of
negligent infliction of severe mental distress, many courts now
permit a claim for severe mental distress unaccompanied by physi-
cal manifestations. 18
It is true that, in some difficult contexts, courts may limit re-
covery in emotional distress claims to situations in which there
could have been physical harm to the plaintiff. Thus, courts some-
times ask whether the plaintiff was in the physical danger zone and
could have been physically harmed were it not for his or her good
fortune. Using this standard, if the plaintiff was never in danger of
being physically harmed, some courts deny recovery for mental dis-
tress. For example, plaintiffs have tended to lose negligent misdi-
agnosis cases in which the physician erroneously tells a healthy
patient that she has a serious disease.19 Because a misdiagnosis of
this sort, however negligent, does not threaten physical harm to the
patient, courts reason that the danger zone requirement is not sat-
isfied and that plaintiffs mental distress is not actionable. The urge
to limit liability in such cases, however, should not be read as sup-
port for a rigid hierarchy based on the nature of the harm. Instead,
the rationale for limiting liability to cases in which there is poten-
tial physical harm most probably is found in administrative con-
cerns, i.e., in the desire to find a bright line rule to limit the num-
ber of claims. In this context, the danger zone requirement sets a
rather arbitrary limit on the number of plaintiffs who may recover,
without suggesting that emotional injuries suffered by persons out-
side the danger zone are by their nature different from injuries suf-
fered by persons within the danger zone.
Equally unpersuasive is the trend argument that asserts
that emotional distress cases are on the decline. It is surely not the
case that claims for emotional harm are being phased out or have
ossified into narrow pockets of recovery. We are well past the days
when recovery for negligent infliction of mental distress was limited
to cases involving the mishandling of corpses and death telegram
cases. 20 Instead, the law is developing rapidly and no solid trends
17. See DOBBS, supra note 7, § 306, at 832.
18. See id. § 308, at 835-36.
19. See, e.g., R.J. v. Humana of Fla., Inc., 652 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1995); Heiner v. MoretuzZo,
652 N.E.2d 664 (Ohio 1995). However, other courts have permitted recovery, even when the
defendants conduct posed no possibility of physical harm. See, e.g., Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d
196 (Alaska 1995); Bramer v. Dotson, 437 S.E.2d 773 (W. Va. 1993).
20. See JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS LAW 165 (2000); DOBBS, supra
note 7, § 303, at 825.
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have yet emerged. I recently reviewed the mental distress case law
in one jurisdiction-the state of Louisiana-and discovered a wide
array of claims that defied precise categorization. There were the
now-familiar "bystander" claims for shock at witnessing family
members killed or injured. Interestingly, there were also suits by
motorists who had run over pedestrians and claimed that the negli-
gence of defendants had placed them in the position of harming
third parties and causing them to suffer distress (and shock) from
their "participation" in the accident.21 The fastest growing area for
liability in that state involved fear of AIDS cases 22 and cases in-
volving fear of cancer from exposure to asbestos.23 Because the fear
of contracting an incurable or serious disease often provides the
guarantee of genuineness of harm that many modern courts look
for, plaintiffs had some success in such "fear of' cases. 24
Overall, in this lively area of the law, the categories are
fluid. My personal favorite was a group of cases allowing recovery
for mental distress suffered in an "ordeal in progress"-such as a
train derailment or explosion-where plaintiffs injury is close in
time and distance to the event, even though plaintiff was not in the
physical danger zone.2 5
My point here is not to suggest that there is or should be re-
covery in each of these new types of cases. However, I do contend
that this is a dynamic area of the law where we are likely to see
more development and new trends emerging. Recovery for negligent
infliction of mental distress should not be written off as inconse-
quential when courts will increasingly be called upon to articulate
new boundaries of liability.
Once the arguments premised on a hierarchy of types of
harm and on judicial trends are rejected as insufficient to justify
excluding emotional harm from the core of tort law, we are left with
the largely theoretical questions underlying the argument based on
analytical coherence. In essence, the claim is that it makes sense to
separate physical harm as a category from emotional harm and to
construct different legal regimes for each type of harm. For the
21. See Clomon v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 572 So. 2d 571 (La. 1990); Guillory v. Arceneaux,
580 So. 2d 990 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
22. See, e.g., Vallery v. S. Baptist Hosp., 630 So. 2d 861 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
23. See, e.g., Lilley v. Bd. of Supervisors, 98-1277 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/24/99), 735 So. 2d 696.
24. See, e.g., Vallier v. La. Health Sys., Inc., 98-834, p.6 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/9/98), 722 So.2d
418; see also Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993); S. Cent. Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Pickering, 749
So.2d 95 (Miss. 1999); Hartwig v. Or. Trail Eye Clinic, 580 N.W.2d 86 (Neb. 1998); Williamson v.
Waldman, 696 A.2d 14 (N.J. 1997).
25. See McDonald v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 546 So. 2d 1287 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
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purposes of drafting a Restatement, this analytical move is conven-
ient because it simultaneously restricts the domain of cases subject
to the general principles stated in the Restatement and labels the
rules in emotional distress as special and particular. By doing so, it
puts less pressure on the Restatement of General Principles to ex-
plain a difficult class of cases and suggests that the rulings in emo-
tional distress cases are not likely to have significance beyond their
narrow category.
There are three reasons, however, why the argument based
on analytical coherence is unpersuasive and does not support the
sharp separation of physical and emotional harms that the Re-
statement tries to erect. First, in law as in other disciplines, there is
a growing recognition both of the importance of emotion and of the
inseparability of emotion from reason.26 From Antonio Damasio's
pathbreaking book, Descartes' Error,27 to Martha Nussbaum's
writing on emotions in criminal law,2 scholars have moved away
from explanations that place "the mental" and "the physical" in
separate analytical categories. Instead, researchers are trying to
develop new models of mindibody interactions that stress their in-
terdependence. We are growing to understand that affect and emo-
tion influence people's ability to make decisions and to appreciate
the consequences of their actions. The new take-home message is
that there is no sharp separation between cognitive processes and
emotional states.
Not surprisingly, attempts to separate physical from mental
harms in the law have not worked well. In fact there is still some
question as to what should count as an emotional harm case.2 Ear-
her courts treated all harms stemming from fright, even clearly
26. See, e.g., Symposium on Law, Psychology and the Emotions, 74 CHI.-KENT L REV. 1423
(2000).
27. ANTONIO R DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERRoR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HMAN BRAIN
(1994).
28. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal
Law, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 269 (1996).
29. The Discussion Draft is not entirely clear on this point. The basic provision on negli-
gence liability covers "negligent conduct that is a legal cause of physical harm." Discussion Draft,
supra note 1, § 3. The commentary to Section 3 defines "[plhysical harm" to consist of"personal
injury and property damage." Id. § 3 cmt. a. This language suggests that the exclusion applies
only to cases of "pure" emotional harm in which the plaintiff suffers no accompanying physical
injury or physical consequences. Goldberg and Zipursky apparently read Section 3 in this fash-
ion. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 665, 674-75, 692. However, the commentary to
Section 3 notes only that physical harm "does not include economic losses or emotional distress
that are not the consequences of physical harm," without discussing the proper characterization
of cases involving physical harm produced by fright or other strong emotions. Discussion Draft,
supra note 1, § 3 cmt. a.
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physical events like heart attacks and stillbirths, as cases of emo-
tional harm. 30 Newer cases more often focus on the effects of defen-
dant's conduct, rather than on the mechanism of the harm.31 Over-
all, the line between the physical and the mental has increasingly
blurred, as evidenced by a twenty-first century illness such as
chronic fatigue syndrome. I doubt seriously if this is a propitious
time to reaffirm the mind/body duality in a new Restatement.
Second, pushing emotional harm out of the core of tort law
signals that general principles of negligence law will not control the
outcome in negligent infliction of mental distress cases, suggesting
that these cases are governed invariably by a specialized set of
rules. However, there is no such clarity in the decisions of the
courts. It is still very much a live issue as to whether, and in what
contexts, emotional distress cases should be treated like "ordinary"
negligence cases. Particularly in so-called direct victim or inde-
pendent duty cases, 32 in which the plaintiff can cast herself as
something other than a witness to another's harm, several courts
have held that general negligence principles apply without further
refinement or limitation.33 It is unfair to suggest that the debate is
over.
Third, exclusion of mental distress from the core of tort law
implies that close analysis of mental distress cases will not tell us
anything important about the structure and basic features of negli-
gence claims more generally. It obscures an important dynamic of a
socially constructed system like law, namely, that what is located at
the margins affects how we view and describe what is in the core or
center. I believe this is one of Goldberg and Zipursky's major points.
They contend that the Discussion Draft is able to understate the
significance of the duty element in tort law only because it excludes
a wide variety of cases, including the emotional harm cases. 34
One of the many reasons I like to have my students study
negligent infliction of mental distress cases is that they often pro-
30. See Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896); Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v.
Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C. 1888).
31. In "near miss" cases, for example, courts allow plaintiffs who fear for their own safety to
recover for the physical effects of fright. See, e.g., Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12, 17 (N.J. 1965)
(allowing pedestrian almost struck by automobile to recover damages).
32. The leading case is Burgess v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1197 (Cal. 1992). For a discus-
sion of the independent duty cases, see DOBBS, supra note 7, § 312, at 848-51.
33. Recently, two courts have clearly expressed a desire to eliminate all special restrictions
in negligent infliction of mental distress cases. See Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press, 896 P.2d
411, 418-26 (Mont. 1996); Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 443-46 (Tenn. 1996).
34. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 669-73.
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vide vivid examples of a more general feature of negligence cases,
namely, the seamless web quality of the elements of duty, breach,
proximate cause, and damages. Take, for example, the bystander
case involving a plaintiff who is not related to the primary accident
victim. When a person (outside the physical danger zone) suffers
shock at witnessing an injury to a direct victim, the court may
choose to deny recovery on any of four grounds tied to the four ele-
ments of the negligence claim. Thus, the claim might fail on the ba-
sis of no duty to a bystander; that the injury was unforeseeable and
thus there was no breach of duty; that proximate cause was lacking
because the injury was too remote or indirect; or that the type of
damage, i.e., emotional harm, was not a legally cognizable type of
harm. I do not think there is one right way to analyze such a case,
even though we are more inclined these days to speak in terms of
no duty or no cognizable type of harm. Instead, in this and in many
other kinds of negligence cases, the elements are interrelated: What
is regarded as reasonably foreseeable or unforeseeable or direct or
indirect is affected by the nature of the harm and vice versa. Taking
emotional harm out of the core of negligence tends to obscure the
complex interrelationship among the elements and may send the
misleading impression that the domain of each element is fixed,
rather than contested and a matter of argument and judgment.
In the final analysis, I do not believe that liability for emo-
tional distress can be set aside quite so easily simply by character-
izing it as outside the core of tort law. The exclusion weakens the
Discussion Draft in two respects. It fails to give serious treatment
to an important and emerging area of law and it narrows the appli-
cability of the General Principles, perhaps to such an extent that we
might begin to question their general applicability.
In contrast to the Discussion Draft, the Goldberg and Zipur-
sky article recognizes the value of including negligent infliction of
emotional harm within the new Restatement, primarily to illustrate
the need for separate treatment of limited duty cases. Their conven-
tional structuring of the four elements of the negligence action
places "emotional distress" along with "failure to rescue" and "eco-
nomic harm" cases as recurring instances in which the courts are
more reluctant to find a duty to act reasonably.
Goldberg and Zipursky's impressive attempt to offer their
own version of a Restatement of General Principles, however, is not
comprehensive and likely was not intended to be so. Their two terse
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sections devoted to emotional distress3 5 do not capture the diversity
and complexities of the case law and suggest limitations on recov-
ery that are not generally recognized in the cases. For example, un-
der their proposal, recovery in "fear for oneself' cases is limited to
plaintiffs who experience "fear of imminent, harmful physical con-
tact." There is no hint that many courts have allowed recovery for
"fear of AIDS" and "fear of cancer" where there has been actual ex-
posure to the HIV virus or cancer causing agent,36 even though con-
tracting the disease was not imminent or even probable. Similarly,
their proposal does not attempt to tackle the difficult task of ade-
quately describing the boundary between so-called direct and indi-
rect victim cases. It simply bypasses that issue by indicating that
bystander recovery will be treated in a separate section.3 7 Finally,
their proposal introduces a new rule (not explicitly found in the
case law) that imposes liability in cases where the defendant han-
dles an "extremely sensitive matter" on behalf of the plaintiff where
it could be expected that, if the matter were mishandled, it "would
likely cause serious emotional distress in a person of ordinary sen-
sibilities."38 The commentary accompanying this provision explains
that it is an attempt to offer "a generic description of cases involv-
ing false death telegrams, mishandling of corpses and other in-
stances in which an actor undertakes to exercise care in handling a
sensitive matter."39 This generic expansion of the traditional excep-
tions to denying recovery, while creative, runs counter to Goldberg
and Zipursky's stated desire strictly to restate the doctrine estab-
35. Goldberg and Zipursky offer the following two subsections under the primary heading of
Limited Duties of Care:
(b) Duties to Avoid Causing Serious Emotional Distress.
(1) An actor is under a general duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid
causing another to experience serious emotional distress through fear of im-
minent, harmful physical contact;
(2) An actor is under a limited duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid
causing serious emotional distress to another if:
(A) the actor undertook on behalf of the other to exercise care in handling
an extremely sensitive matter that, if mishandled, would likely cause se-
rious emotional distress in a person of ordinary sensibilities.
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, app. § D2.
36. In such cases, most states require plaintiffs to prove that they have been "actually ex-
posed" to the HIV virus through a medically sound channel of transmission that could have
caused AIDS. See DOBBS, supra note 7, § 311, at 845. A minority of courts have allowed recovery
for reasonable fear of AIDS, even when the plaintiff cannot prove that she has been actually
exposed to the virus, such as in cases of accidental needle pricks where it is not known whether
the needle is contaminated. See id. § 311, at 846 & n.13.
37. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, app. § D2 cmt. e.
38. Id. app. § D2(b)(2)(A).
39. Id. app. § D2 cmt. g.
762 [Vol. 54:3:751
REMOVING EMOTIONAL HARM
lished in the cases and to refrain from imposing order onto a body of
law that is far less organized.
By including emotional distress cases within the body of tort
law subject to general negligence principles, the Goldberg and
Zipursky draft introduces at least some of the issues that surface in
emotional distress cases and responds to my arguments related to
analytical coherence. Their attempt, however, to confine emotional
distress cases within two narrow boxes may send some of the same
dismissive messages as the Discussion Draft. In particular, their
treatment of emotional distress suggests that emotional harm is by
its nature of lesser importance than physical harm or property
damage and that there is little chance of the law changing in a di-
rection that recognizes new types of claims or significantly enlarges
areas of recovery.
I recognize, of course, that the appendix to the Goldberg and
Zipursky article is offered not primarily for its specifics, but for its
alternative framework, one in which "duty" figures more promi-
nently and in which "policy-based exemptions from liability"40 are
treated as qualitatively different from other no-duty or limited duty
restrictions. In closing, I wish briefly to explain why I am not yet
ready to sign onto Goldberg and Zipursky's relational theory of
negligence, despite the eloquent and forceful presentation of their
theory in this and prior articles. 41
My main reservation is that Goldberg and Zipursky's rela-
tional theory of negligence does not help much to analyze recurring
cases, like the fear of AIDS cases, in which plaintiffs fear for their
own safety but there is no imminent danger of physical harm. Posit,
for example, the case in which a patient in a hospital is pricked by a
syringe or needle that was improperly disposed of or improperly
sterilized, and there is no way to tell whether the needle was con-
taminated by HIV positive blood.42 The plaintiff sues after he is ad-
vised by his doctor to undergo testing for AIDS and develops a fear
of contracting the disease. Most courts would deny recovery in such
a case, unless plaintiff could prove that the needle was in fact con-
taminated by HIV positive blood. If recovery is to be denied even
though the patient's fear is arguably reasonable (at least for the
"window of anxiety" until the tests prove to be negative), is it be-
40. Id. app. § E.
41. See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L
REv. 1733 (1998); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51
VAND. L REV. 1 (1998)
42. See eg., Stewart v. St. Francis Cabrini Hosp., 96-1167 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/11/97), 698 So.
2d 1; Walker v. Allen Parish Health Unit, 97-1007 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/1/98), 711 So. 2d 734.
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cause there is no duty to the patient? Or because there is no duty to
protect against this particular risk? Is this a policy-based exemp-
tion to liability or simply an application of a limited duty rule? In
my view, there is a clear duty to protect the plaintiff in such a case
simply because he is a patient. If there is to be no recovery for fear
of AIDS, even during the window of anxiety, it is best explained by
policy concerns about ruinous liability, concerns for perpetuating
myths about the spread of AIDS and a desire to reserve funds for
the truly unlucky victims who actually contract the disease. I must
confess, however, I cannot tell from the Goldberg and Zipursky arti-
cle how they would analyze such a case. I am not sure whether the
outcome in such a case turns on lack of "duty in the primary sense"
under Goldberg and Zipursky's scheme.
On the other hand, in the classic bystander suit,43 a rela-
tional theory of negligence seems more useful. I believe that one
reason why courts have permitted recovery for close relatives who
suffer shock at witnessing injury and death of loved ones, and have
tended to deny recovery to all other witnesses, is that they place a
higher value on family relationships. I agree with Goldberg and
Zipursky that it is not useful to focus the debate over liability in
bystander cases on macro-level policy questions. They are wise
when they assert that courts would do better to ask whether there
is a duty or a sense of obligation to protect a family member from
the special harm that stems from seeing the accident itself. In my
view, however, this is not because the analytical structure of all
torts claims is relational. Rather, of the four elements in the negli-
gence claim, duty here simply provides a convenient vehicle to in-
vestigate the quality and significance of the real-life relationship
between the plaintiff and the accident victim. Allowing recovery in
such a case, through Dillon-type rules or guidelines, has the virtue
of exposing and taking into account the interrelationship among
physical, emotional, and relational harms, given that it is the
physical harm to the direct accident victim which causes emotional
distress to a witness, largely because of the witness's special rela-
tionship to the victim. It also makes the priorities of recovery
among classes of persons explicit, much like legislative schemes for
prioritizing recovery for wrongful death. However, this more full-
bodied relational approach to negligence, most often associated with
43. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 711.
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feminist theories,44 does not bear a strong resemblance to either
Cardozo's or to Goldberg and Zipursky's analytical approach. And, I
must admit, it finds little support in the current cases in which li-
ability rarely depends on the existence of intimate or other noncon-
tractual relationships.
In the end, I am not convinced that "duty in the primary
sense" can be disentangled from other policy-based limitations on
recovery-either in tort theory, the adjudication of cases, or in a
Restatement of law. I like Goldberg and Zipursky's version because
it does not ignore the significance of emotional harm cases, but the
realist in me strongly suspects that the concept of duty will resist
even this latest, sophisticated attempt to nail it down.
44. See eg., Leslie Bender, A Lauyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3, 4 (1988); Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibili-
ties, 1 YALE J.L & FEMINISM 7, 8 (1989); Jennifer Nedelsky, Rcconceiving Rights as Relation-
ship, 1 REV. CONST. STUD. 1 (1993).
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